Democracy and Territorial Autonomy: Recent Insights from Turkey

Elçin Aktoprak

School of Human Rights Association

Could any form of territorial or non-territorial autonomy in Turkey provide a solution to the Kurdish question? It is a possibility, but not in the immediate future. So, why am I addressing this topic in a blog symposium? Because discussing any kind of autonomy, both in theory and practice, is closely intertwined with the concept of democracy.

The nation, as a social construct, is not identical to the state as a political entity, but the principle of self-determination is a crucial concept inherent in the nation since its inception, giving it a political character. As the notion of a nation relies on its members acknowledging their common identity, the principle of self-determination becomes essential in the process of self-definition. However, the right to self-determination should not be limited to the demand for independence or internal self-government but encompasses a broad spectrum, including linguistic and cultural rights. In this context, the right to self-determination is closely related to autonomy, which begins with the freedom to define one’s own identity. On the other hand, autonomy depends on the will of an individual or group and the environment in which that will is implemented. Despite some progress, such as the recognition instead of the denial of Kurdish identity, the current situation in Turkey does not represent an ideal state in this regard.

Regarding territorial autonomy, we know that its existence does not guarantee a democratic regime. However, in countries like Turkey, where even discussing territorial autonomy is difficult due to authoritarianism and democratic deficits, the absence of such discussions directly relates to the issue. Turkey has faced challenges in addressing autonomy for the past 100 years, despite the Treaty of Lausanne, which includes various forms of autonomy. The Kurdish political movement in Turkey has long demanded territorial autonomy, rooted in its historical ties to the Ottoman past. Nevertheless, during the recent peace process between 2013 and 2015, they deliberately avoided placing autonomy on the negotiation agenda. They abstained because doing so would provoke a negative reaction from nationalist public opinion at that time and hinder the progress towards peace.

Approximately 20 million Kurds reside in Turkey, with certain cities and regions dominated by Kurdish populations where territorial autonomy could be discussed. Moreover, non-territorial autonomy could be explored for Kurds living in developed cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. However, under the current regime, discussing minority rights without them being perceived as security threats by the government is challenging. This restriction on freedom of thought and expression has led to censorship, self-censorship, and the targeting of any discussions outside the official discourse, particularly related to Turkish nationalism. Those participating in such discussions often face persecution, imprisonment, and social pressure. Human rights defenders continue to advocate for basic human rights, equal civil rights, and the rule of law amid increasing impunity, much like their counterparts in other authoritarian parts of the world.

The academic environment in Turkey is also constrained, with certain topics, such as the Armenian question, Kurdish question, ethnic identities, sexual identities, religion and criticism of the government being considered taboo. Academics fear administrative and judicial investigations, social, local, and political pressure, as well as denunciation by their students and obstacles to academic promotion if they research these topics outside the confines of the official ideology. 

In 2023, the Kurdish question persists due to structural and cultural violence, making any form of autonomy as a solution challenging to discuss. The primary policy towards the Kurds remains staunch centralization, where Kurdish demands are perceived as threats to the unity and integrity of the nation and the state. Although there were some short-lived efforts towards European Union integration and peace negotiations during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era, the structural and cultural disparities persist. One positive development is the acknowledgment of the Kurdish identity, instead of the long-lasting denial. However, it is still defined within the confines of the regime, with a condescending attitude of power.

Under AKP rule, Kurds have been divided into categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Those who dare to assert their demands for autonomy or express a violation of their identity often face legal consequences, while individuals who agree with the AKP’s ideology are labeled ‘good’ Kurds and their identity is recognized. Consequently, the Kurdish issue was reinterpreted as a security issue after the failure of the peace process in 2015. Since the coup attempt in 2016, the Kurdish movement has been subjected to increasing security measures and repression throughout the country. Pro-Kurdish Peoples’s Democratic Party leaders and former deputies like Selahattin Demirtaş, Gülten Kışanak have been in prison for years in contravention of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Hundreds of party members face similar situations. 

The Kurdish media also experiences continuous repression, and many journalists are imprisoned. Moreover, attending Kurdish-language plays or performances has become difficult, with instances of violence against artists who refuse to sing nationalist Turkish songs or who desire to perform a play in Kurdish. Notably, the replacement Peoples’s Democratic Party mayors elected in 2019 with appointed “trustees” has significantly impaired fair elections and local administration in Kurdish cities, let alone any possibility of autonomy.

In conclusion, despite the potential of autonomy as a solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey, there are persisting challenges rooted in authoritarianism, democratic deficits, and cultural violence based on nationalism, which make even discussing autonomy difficult. As of now, neither autonomy nor other minority rights can be openly discussed or demanded. Instead, the focus has shifted back to the struggle for the most fundamental rights, such as the right to life, the prohibition on torture and ill-treatment, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of assembly and association. It is important to emphasize that I am not implying a hierarchy among these rights, but rather pointing out that the fight for minority rights in a social and political sphere limited and weakened by the absence of fundamental rights has regressed significantly once more in Turkey.

Elçin Aktoprak is the Administrative Coordinator of the School of Human Rights Association, Turkey.

This blog post is a result of a workshop of the network of scholars of territorial autonomy initiated by the Åland Islands Peace Institute. The network first met and discussed ‘The Many Faces of Territorial Autonomy’ at a workshop in Berlin, convened in cooperation with the Finland Institute in Berlin. The blog symposium is hosted by the IACL Research Group on Constitutionalism and Societal Pluralism: Diversity Governance Compared.

Suggested Citation: Elçin Aktoprak, ‘Democracy and Territorial Autonomy: Recent Insights from Turkey’ IACL-AIDC Blog (17 October 2023) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/territorial-autonomy/2023/10/12/democracy-and-territorial-autonomy-recent-insights-from-turkey