The Debate on the Istanbul Convention in Turkey: A Populist Reinterpretation of the Principle of Gender Equality

Valentina Rita Scotti

Koç University

The Debate on the Istanbul Convention 

Notwithstanding the State’s evident commitment at the moment of its ratification in 2012, the substance of the Istanbul Convention (IC) has been progressively challenged in Turkey. 

The IC, which aims to prevent and combat domestic violence and violence against women, includes fundamental definitions of controversial concepts. These definitions are at the core of the debate about withdrawal from the IC that has emerged in Turkey. Indeed, Article 3 of the IC defines gender as “the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men”. This does not supplant the terms ‘women’ and ‘men’, nor does it replace the notion of sex indicating a biological given dependant on the reproductive organs individuals were born with. Building on this definition, the IC requires that States “take the necessary measures to promote changes in the social and cultural patterns of behaviour of women and men with a view to eradicating customs, traditions and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women or on stereotyped roles for women and men” (art. 12).  

In 2020, some conservative politicians began to contest these definitions and question their compatibility with the prevailing conception of the family within the country. Although the IC merely creates a state duty to respect the principles of equality and non-discrimination and to avoid gender-based discrimination – and it does not explicitly require provisions for same-sex marriage or any special status for LGBTQIA* individuals – these were the main reasons cited to justify the withdrawal. These reasons were offered in full awareness that a lack of compliance with the IC would raise related constitutional issues. Indeed, according to art. 90 of the Turkish Constitution as amended in 2004, the provisions of duly ratified international agreements on human rights prevail over domestic legislation.  

For the same stated reasons, on 2 July 2020, AKP Deputy Chairman Numan Kurtulmuş stated in an interview that the IC introduced foreign concepts contrary to the understanding of Turkish society, namely the notions of non-binary gender and sexual orientation. This opinion echoes a position previously expressed in 2019 by Abdurrahman Dilipak, a popular Islamist columnist, who described the IC as “a devil with an angel’s face” and “a trap” set to destroy the traditional family.  

Fearing a possible reduction of the protections available to women following withdrawal, NGOs and associations working with victims of gender-based violence strongly opposed this approach. For instance, human rights lawyer and activist Meline Cilingir of Mor Cati (a Turkish organisation that tackles violence against women) openly declared that women’s rights organizations were prepared to appeal the decision to withdraw from the IC before the Constitutional Court and seek its reversal. Similarly, the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) has requested the Executive not withdraw from the IC. Surveys of the political opposition show that withdrawal is not considered a suitable option. Indeed, according to a survey organized by Metropoll, 83.2% of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) voters, 85.2% of the İYİ (Good) Party voters, and 67.2% percent of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) voters said they were against the withdrawal from the Convention.  

In fact, in the same survey, 39.1% of the voters of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), an ally of the AKP, declared themselves against the withdrawal and AKP voters are mostly against it too. Only 17% of the participants expressed approval for the withdrawal, a full 63.6% stated their opposition. Furthermore, women within the ranks of the AKP have expressed considerable dissent. Namely, the daughter of the President, Sumeyye Erdoğan Bayraktar, declared the opposition of the Women and Democracy Platform (Kadem), an organisation she co-founded in 2013 that is deeply committed to implementing the IC. In addition, several women’s associations have threatened to organise mass demonstrations in the event the government were to present a bill of withdrawal in Parliament.  

As a result, discussions relating to a final decision on withdrawal from the IC have been postponed several times since August 2020. Moreover, this reflects the party’s fear of alienating the female electorate, which would appear to be the majority of AKP voters. The party has, instead, decided to advance its objections to the IC through the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO). Although it is already clear that the IC allows for withdrawal (art. 80), it does not provide a mechanism for amending the definition of gender and sexual orientation contained at Article 4.  

 Gender Equality in Turkey: From State Feminism to Islamic Populism   

The current debate is merely one more manifestation of the Turkish legal system’s ongoing struggle, since the establishment of the Republic, to grapple with gender equality. Indeed, during the Kemalist period, a state feminism was established that strongly linked the emancipation of women to the respect of the principles of that political movement. Following a trajectory that is very common and shared by other forms of state feminism – especially those which developed a few decades later in Latin America – Turkish women obtained political rights, and crucially the right to vote (1935), and their exclusion from public life was ended by encouraging their participation in public life. Nevertheless, and not unlike coeval legal systems around the world, the reforms to the Civil Code introduced during this period replicated the patriarchal family structure typical of the Ottoman period. Indeed, spouses lacked equal status in marriage and the husband remained the head of the family and the main breadwinner whose decisions over children’s welfare and education prevailed. Similarly, the Criminal Code continued to conceive of women as a ‘family commodity’. Rape, for instance, was defined as an offence against the social order rather than a crime against the individual.  

Despite the important legislative and constitutional amendments passed under internal and international pressures, especially since the beginning of the XXI century, Islamic populism has replaced Kemalist populism. Gender equality is thus endangered by attempts to marginalize women within the confines of the family structure – a trend that Islamic feminism is also opposing. This emerges, for instance, in the provisions of the 2004 Penal Code and the 2012 Law on the Protection of Family and Prevention of Violence against Women, where the important achievements for the protection against gender-based violence are intended as measures to protect the family and enacted in this perspective.   

Furthermore, although the current Constitution prohibits sex-based discrimination (for example, art. 10 affirms the equal rights of men and women and compels the state to adopt affirmative actions to ensure this equality of status), the protection of women’s rights is framed within the broader protection of vulnerable groups (children, the elderly, disabled people, widows, orphans of martyrs, invalids and veterans). Similarly, women’s protection in the field of employment (art. 48) is either grouped along with the labour rights of minors and physically and mentally disabled persons or addressed in the context of their maternity rights (Labour Code). In brief, an ostensibly ameliorative legal framework constrains women by making protections contingent upon their position within the traditional family structure.   

This legal framework, coupled with numerous declarations by President Erdoğan and other members of the AKP, underscores the depth of opposition to ensuring full equality between men and women and a degree of support for the theory of gender complementary, which also finds some support in religious tenets. At a meeting with the representatives of women’s organisations in 2010, for instance, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan declared: “Men and women cannot be equal, they are different. They complement each other. I am not in favour of equality, but equality of opportunity”.  

Concluding Remarks 

Equality between men and women in Turkey has been jeopardized both when the State was led by resolutely secularist principle and when a religious orientation consolidated among policy-makers. Indeed, during both periods, women were exploited for the aims of the ruling elite. When the government aimed at modernization through Europeanization, the new female citizen was glorified – even though she was, simultaneously, conceived as a citizen under the tutelage of the (male) elite. Conversely, in the times of Islamic Populism, women are expected to embody the adherence to religious principles and to support the policies for the demographic growth. Thus, their role inside the family is the main target of the ruling elite. Whereas Kemalist populism could have represented a first step towards a real emancipation for Turkish women, the Islamic populist approach raises more doubts about the future implementation of gender equality in line with international standards. The current challenges to the IC are an illustration of this risk.  

(This blog post is an edited version of the author’s presentation at the Global Summit, hosted by the International Forum on the Future of Constitutionalism, on 14 January 2021.) 

Valentina Rita Scotti is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the School of Law of Koç University (Istanbul, Turkey).

Suggested citation: Valentina Rita Scotti, ‘The Debate on the Istanbul Convention in Turkey: A populist reinterpretation of the principle of gender equality’ IACL-AIDC Blog (18 February 2021) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/gender/2021/2/18/the-debate-on-the-istanbul-convention-in-turkey-a-populist-reinterpretation-of-the-principle-of-gender-equality.