State, Constitution and Democracy in Divided Societies: The Case of Lebanon

Giulia Salvatore

Divided societies are characterised by the presence of strong divisions among groups having deep divergences in terms of ethnicity, religion, and politics, yet living in the same state or territory. When approaching these cases, one is also dealing with consociationalism and power-sharing mechanisms. The latter are the means designated to manage conflict in deeply divided societies. Consociationalism, meanwhile, is the method through which political rule can be established in an ethnically and religiously divided society, by organising political relationships through constitutional provisions, proportional representation, and grants of autonomy to the different groups. The most common term to describe these societies is “power-sharing democracies”. 

Lebanon – because of its idiosyncratic social and political structures, along with its legal system, a combination of Civil Law, Islamic and Ottoman legal principles and the law of the Lebanese legislature – presents a striking demonstration of the exercise of power in a multi-communitarian society. Indeed, Lebanon is a remarkably diverse and pluralistic society composed of eighteen distinct ethno-religious groups. Each group’s unique identity is shaped, in a very different way, by its religious affiliation, conception of its history, and its relations with the “other”.

According to the Constitution, the Lebanese State follows a classic parliamentary model. The Lebanese Constitution also guarantees certain fundamental rights to its citizens: liberty, equality, private property, freedom of thought, etc.

Because of its confessional quota and power-sharing system; Lebanon’s democracy is based on consensus rather than majoritarian rule. The political system of Lebanon operates through power sharing organised along sectarian lines. This system affords political representation to the groups and provide them a degree of autonomy in the regulation of matters relating to personal status, education, marriage and other cultural or social affairs.

In this post, my intention is to examine the role played by confessionalism and power sharing in Lebanon through an analysis of its Constitution. In particular, I argue that the Constitution of Lebanon relies on what could be understood as a paradox: it relies on the idea of overcoming confessional representation “as national goal that should be achieved according to a staged plan”, while giving instructions for its implementation.

Lijphart’s Consociational Theory in Lebanon

Power sharing and sectarian lines are grounded in two pacts: the National Pact of 1943 and the Taif Agreement of 1990. The first, unwritten pact of 1943 created a precedent for the establishment of a grand coalition government wherein the president would always be a Maronite, the prime minister would always be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament would always be a Shia Muslim. The various communities were to be proportionally represented in the Cabinet, and a ratio of 6 to 5 between Christians and Muslims was eventually adopted for the legislature. The second pact, the Taif Agreement, put an end to the fifteen-year Lebanese Civil War, which started in 1975 and ended in 1990, with the signature of the agreement in the Saudi city of Taif. The Taif agreement memorialised the National Accord, altering some previously established power-sharing arrangements and stipulating parity between Muslims and Christians in the Parliament.

As far as the relationship between democracy and the political system in Lebanon is concerned – or, for that matter, the Lebanese confessional political model – discussion of the topic has never been straightforward. The advent of the sectarian power-sharing system in the country is described by many, nowadays, as a political miracle that carried the seeds of its own destruction. Whether the Lebanese power-sharing system can be regarded as the most suitable democratic design for such a divided society remains an open question because it is likely among the many sources of the country’s internal instability.

As a matter of fact, the application of consociational theory in the Lebanese context might generate some problems. The power-sharing model observed in Lebanon borrows heavily from Lijphart’s consociational theory, but with some deviations. This is because the consociational model – as a normative paradigm – differs from the political implementation in the Lebanese case. The consociational theory has always been understood as a normative theory, even though it is also used to inform policymaking. Nevertheless, a true consociation can never meet the precise criteria spelled out by the theory of consociationalism itself. As far as Lebanon is concerned, its consociational model has not delivered some aspects of the model. 

The terms cited before, i.e., power sharing, consociationalism and consociational democracy, are sometimes qualified by the terms of “political confessionalism or sectarianism”. These are terms used to describe the Lebanese political system. According to the sectarian perspective, it is the eighteen Lebanese communities who draw the boundaries in the social stratification of the country and its political life. Therefore, the various sects are not only considered religious actors, but also political ones in the national, regional, and international arenas.

Power-sharing mechanisms, consociationalism, and the application of the theory of consociational democracy are reflected in the two pacts cited above. Together, these pacts are known as the Lebanese tayfiyya (ie. Lebanese confessionalism). 

In 1943, the National Pact paved the way for the definition of confessional representation in the Lebanese State. The unwritten pact, stipulated by Bechara al-Khoury and Riad al-Solh, distributed political power among the different Lebanese communities. This resulted in the confessional nature of political representation within the country. With the Taif Agreement of 1990 confessional representation within the country became even more explicit. The power-sharing mechanism is described at Article 24(1)(ii).  According to Article 24, the Chamber of Deputies shall distribute its seats according to confessional principles. These principles include the equal representation of Christians and Muslims and proportional representation among the confessional groups within the communities and across geographic regions. 

The Lebanese Constitution and its Paradox 

However, Article 95 of the Constitution also evinces a willingness to overcome confessional representation by relegating it to a “transitional phase”. In this transitional phase, both Lebanese Christians and Lebanese Muslims should be engaged in the abolition of political confessionalism. However, even though Article 95 calls for the abolition of confessional political representation, it also organises political representation along community lines. As a result, while Article 95 seeks to eliminate confessionalism it simultaneously provides clear recognition of confessionalism as the political system of Lebanon. By providing instructions for its implementation, Article 95 reinforces and perpetuates confessionalism as Lebanon’s political system.

Both Article 24 and Article 95 reflect a new attitude towards confessionalism and the organization of constitutional powers along confessional lines 

With the Taif Agreement, the redistribution of power between the three different political figures – the President of the Republic (Christian Maronite), the Prime Minister (Sunni Muslim) and the President of the Parliament (Shia Muslim) – became the country’s de jure political system. 

The balance between these three statal powers suggests a Troika political system. Article 53(1) of the Lebanese Constitution states that the President of the Republic must inform the Speaker of the Parliament about parliamentary consultations regarding the designation of the next Prime Minister. With respect to the role of the President of the Parliament, an amendment to Article 58 of the Lebanese Constitution endowed him with discretionary power, requiring that the Council of Ministries take the position of the President of the Parliament into account before forwarding a law to the Chamber. This is achieved by the reservation of a certain number of ministerial seats for people who represent the President of the Parliament. Consequently, the consensus mechanism between the executive and the legislative were eventually installed. 

Article 64 of the Constitution places the Prime Minister and the President on equal terms, requiring both political actors’ countersignatures for the adoption of all decrees. It also underlines specific areas where the two political actors are on equal footing and must cooperate.

Consensus mechanism is one of the main pillars of Consociational theory present in the Lebanese Constitution, as well as being one of the pillars of the theory of Consociational democracy as described by Arendt Lijphart. Consensus decisions, in this sense, should guarantee the inclusion of all political actors, opinions, and political parties.

To conclude, the Lebanese case is very idiosyncratic in its nature. As a multi-faith society that operates on the basis of consensus and embraces a power-sharing mechanism organised along sectarian lines to distribute political power between its Muslim and Christian communities, Lebanon is regarded as Consociational democracy. The introduction of confessional representation dates back to 1943, although it was eventually formalised in 1990, after the end of the civil war. Nevertheless, the Constitution of Lebanon indicates a willingness to end confessionalism by relegating it to a “transitory phase”. The paradox within the text of the Constitution rests on this suggestion of a prospective move beyond confessional representation alongside instructions for its implementation. 

Lebanon’s system of political confessionalism was once regarded as the best possible solution for a divided country, but the wisdom of this choice is now contested. Dissatisfaction with political confessionalism was one of the central claims of the Lebanese thawra (revolution) of October 2019.

Three years later, the suitability of Lebanon’s power-sharing mechanisms and the democratic design of the Lebanese political system remain contested. Indeed, they might be regarded as the source of their own instability. 

Giulia Salvatore is a researcher of the Middle East and North Africa focusing on constitutionalism, geopolitical scenarios, security issues, human rights, and inter-religious and peace dialogues in deeply divided societies. She specialises in Lebanese studies, politics, history, and constitutionalism

Suggested Citation: Giulia Salvatore, ‘State, Constitution and Democracy in Divided Societies: the case of Lebanon’ IACL-AIDC Blog (25 October 2022) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/lebanon/2022/10/25/state-constitution-and-democracy-in-divided-societies-the-case-of-lebanon.