Legislative Elections in France: A Choice Between More Presidentialism or More Parliamentarism

Marie Gren

Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University

Since 1962, constitutional artwork by General De Gaulle and his acolytes opened yet another era of hyper-concentration of powers in the hands of the executive in France. Bypassing the formal constitutional path for revision (set out in article 89 of the Constitution of 1958), an  unconstitutional reform was forced upon the parliamentarians to directly elect the French President through a two-round majoritarian election. In retaliation, they successfully overthrew the Government for the only time since the 1958 Constitution was adopted (article 49.1 of the Constitution). Nonetheless, the Constitutional Council upheld the will of the French nation, as expressed through a referendum (article 11 of the Constitution) that ratified the constitutional modification. The Constitution of 1958 had organized a relatively balanced division of power within the executive branch between the President and the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, the change to direct election of the President in 1962, combined with subsequent constitutional practice of De Gaulle and his presidential successors, has created an imbalance in favor of the President. 

In what follows I give a brief overview of different factors contributing to the current imbalance in favor of the President in the French constitutional system and discuss a possible path to correct it. I argue that if a party different from the President’s party is favored in the upcoming legislative elections, such a development could turn French presidentialism into a more traditional parliamentary system.

The President is the Head of the Executive Power 

Articles 20 and 21 of the French Constitution, once championed by Michel Debré who greatly admired the British model, reflect the influence of Westminster. As the first Prime Minister of the Vth Republic, Debré could have played an even greater role in shaping its institutional design. Nonetheless, De Gaulle, as the first President, is the one who set the tone for the next six decades. After a few years in service, Debré was asked—contrary to the wording of article 8 of the Constitution—to hand in his letter of resignation. The letter of the constitutional text allows the President to choose the Prime Minister, but not to dismiss him or her. In addition, the President is most of the time de facto the political leader of the National Assembly – the directly elected chamber of Parliament. As long as the party of the President holds a majority of seats in the National Assembly, the President is free to choose the Prime Minister. Unsurprisingly Presidents have thus chosen relatively low-key political figures as Prime Ministers in order to avoid being overshadowed. As a consequence, there has been an alteration to constitutional provisions balancing the role of the President and the Prime Minister. Article 20 of the Constitution states that: “the Government shall determine and conduct the policy of the Nation” and article 21 that “the Prime Minister shall direct the actions of the Government”. This explicit wording did not deter former President Nicolas Sarkozy from declaring “the Prime Minister is a collaborator and I am the boss. […] I get paid to decide so I decide”. Though not always so openly blunt, all Presidents have fostered this imbalance within the governmental tandem, turning the head of State into the de facto head of Government. 

This concentration of the executive power in the hands of the President has direct consequences for the relationship established between the executive and legislative branch, giving the President strong leverage over legislative proceedings. 

The President’s Strong Leverage Over Legislative Proceedings

The French President is much better off than his American counterpart when it comes to controlling the legislative branch. The French Constitution has been carefully crafted to allow the executive to control parliamentary procedures in response to previous political bad habits. In the two previous Republics, the no-confidence vote had been used abusively, leading to governmental instability. Thus article 49-1 of the 1958 Constitution strongly curtails the use of this parliamentary tool. In addition, the majoritarian two-round electoral system makes it even more difficult for a strong opposition to emerge in the National Assembly. Globally, the use of this electoral system is very rare for elections in the lower house (Blais & Loewen, 2009) and it has deeply affected the constitutional landscape in France. Indeed, the opposition has only once reached the threshold of votes necessary to overthrow the government. This shift of the balance of power in favor of the executive has consequences for legislative proceedings. For example, article 49.3 makes it possible for the Prime Minister to “make the passing of a Finance Bill or Social Security Financing Bill an issue of a vote of confidence before the National Assembly. […] the Bill shall be considered passed unless a resolution of no-confidence […] is carried”. The opposition being incapable of gathering a sufficient number of votes for the motion, the governmental bill will be adopted without discussion in Parliament. This strongly undemocratic measure has been used by nearly all governments since 1958. The numerous other measures to control or even bypass Parliament will continue to be used by future Presidents if legislative elections favor the same party as the President belongs to. Since presidential and legislative elections were aligned in 2000, this has always been the case. 

The Alignment of Presidential and Legislative Elections Increased Presidentialism

In 2000, a constitutional reform drastically enhanced the presidential grip over the National Assembly. The reform, shortening the presidential mandate from seven to five years, was presented at the time as being more democratic. The argument for more frequent elections was thus approved in a referendum. Another side effect was also expected. The legislative and presidential elections would now be just a few weeks apart and would prevent the return of ‘cohabitation’ (a situation where the President and Prime Minister belong to different parties), which had occurred three times since 1958. In 1986, five years after the election of the leftist President François Mitterrand, the right won the legislative elections. Mitterrand still declared “The President of the Republic appoints whomever he wishes. It must naturally place itself in conformity with the popular will. (...) I will have to speak to a personality of the majority to lead the government”. Jacques Chirac, leader of the winning right-wing party became the Prime Minister. Mitterrand was reelected as President in 1988, but his party faced another defeat in the 1993 legislative elections and Mitterrand named Edouard Balladur as head of his government. Finally, in 1997, two years after the election of Jacques Chirac as President, the right lost the legislative elections following the dissolution of the National Assembly. Lionel Jospin, leader of the socialist party, became Prime Minister. In the three cohabitations, there was a balance of power which resembled a more traditional parliamentary system. The Prime Minister was the main political figure, backed by his majority in the National Assembly. For Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac, being strong political figures, this wasn’t easy but the institutional framework held firm. Despite skeptical voices on such a possibility, can we imagine the upcoming legislative elections (to be held in June) could bring cohabitation?

Conclusion: Can the Upcoming Legislative Election Bring Cohabitation Back? 

The unpopularity of newly reelected President Emmanuel Macron partly explains the better scores and growing popularity of Marine Le Pen in the second round. French civil society is more divided than ever and an era of institutional instability might open up. Jean-Luc Mélanchon, the third candidate in the first round of the presidential elections, imagines himself as France’s next Prime Minister. His party may win many seats but probably not enough to lead a coalition in the National Assembly. And the President retains the power under article 8 of the Constitution to nominate an absolute political stranger. Nonetheless in case of a weak presidential majority in the lower house, parliamentarians may gain power and bring back parliamentary aspects of the regime. It is now for voters to decide: more presidentialism or more parliamentarism.

Marie Gren is a Full Professor of Public Law at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University

Suggested Citation: Marie Gren, “Legislative elections in France: a choice between more presidentialism or more parliamentarism”, IACL-AIDC Blog (3 May 2022) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-3/2022/5/3/legislative-elections-in-france-a-choice-between-more-presidentialism-or-more-parliamentarism.