Political Power and Legal Power in the Brazilian Constitution: The Recent Debate on the Role of the Armed Forces

Bruno Ceretta photo.jpg

Bruno Ceretta

University of São Paulo

The famous debate between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt about who should act as guardian of the Constitution is, indeed, well known. While the Austrian jurist argued that this responsibility should lie with the Constitutional Court, the German jurist countered that the power should belong to the head of the Executive branch. 

Although particular arrangements once favoured Schmitt’s proposal, political and legal practice has, over time, embraced the Constitutional Courts model. Since the Second World War, this institutional arrangement has become even more predominant. Recently, Brazil went through a public controversy with many parallels to the aforementioned debate. Against the background of an extremely broad political crisis with economic and social repercussions – and despite the occurrence of a simultaneous health crisis caused by the new coronavirus – the possibility of the Armed Forces acting to resolve conflicts between the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Powers has been raised. It was thought that the Armed Forces could potentially, in this instance, mediate political activity. 

This hypothetical proposition was raised amid rising tension between the Federal Executive, headed by President Jair Bolsonaro, and the Federal Supreme Court. First, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes suspended the appointment of a new director of the Federal Police in the State of Rio de Janeiro. Then, Supreme Court Justice Luís Roberto Barroso suspended the expulsion of officials from the Venezuelan Embassy. These incidents occurred not long after another controversy:  the resignation of former Minister of Justice Sergio Moro who had publicly contradicted President Bolsonaro by accusing him of attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the Federal Police, which is subordinated to his then ministry. 

Angered by the Court’s interference and the suspension of these decisions, groups of Bolsonaro supporters began to protest vehemently against the Supreme Federal Court, even defending the interruption of the Court's activities and its closure. Protesters, both on social media and on the ground, invoked Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution, which provides for the use of the Armed Forces to guarantee the maintenance of law and order. 

This proposal gained ground in legal circles. According to its proponents, the Constitution allows the mobilisation of the Armed Forces, in certain circumstances, to correct excesses committed by the other branches of the State and exercise a moderating function in the event of conflict between the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. The disclosure, on May 22, of a month-old recording of a ministerial meeting in which President Bolsonaro raised the possibility of an application of Article 142 further reinforced this thesis. 

This possibility did not, however, calm the situation down. On the contrary, although the proposed solution has been used in previous moments of tension, including during the past century, the suggestion of its contemporary re-use has generated strong reactions from the country's political and legal community. 

The Brazilian Bar Association, on June 2, published its contrary opinion which qualified the possibility of the Army’s intervention as a case of “biased hermeneutics.” The House of Representatives, on June 3, published its own unfavourable opinion. The House affirmed that a methodical reading of the Constitution, as well as an analysis of institutional practice and legislative decisions under the 1988 Constitution, do not support the possibility of the Army’s intervention. In addition, the Association of Brazilian Magistrates, along with other entities, on June 9, issued a collective statement rejecting this interpretation of Article 142. 

On June 10, in a decision on a writ of injunction, Supreme Court Justice Barroso held that there was no further clarification needed on the matter because the role of the Armed Forces in the Brazilian constitutional order is already abundantly clear. The intervention hypothesis was thus ruled out. 

If the objective was to weaken the Brazilian Supreme Court by strengthening the President of the Republic, the result was quite the opposite. The Court has come out strengthened. The Judiciary and the rule of law, as a whole, received a massive boost in the public’s esteem. 

In practice, the possibility that the Armed Forces might intervene may represent an ‘escape valve’ for the institutional conflicts that Brazil has been going through. Nevertheless, there is no provision for this power in the Constitution. For the Army to take such action, for instance, would depend upon a request for law and order maintenance on the basis of grounds that are legally defined. The Armed Forces cannot, on their own initiative, act ex officio. As in other democracies, the military power is strictly subordinated to civilian control. 

Days after the emergence of the new controversy, the President of the Brazilian Supreme Court issued a forceful statement. On June 20, Justice Dias Toffoli affirmed that the Supreme Federal Court is the guardian of the Constitution, echoing the aforementioned opinion of the House of Representatives. 

It would be impossible to ignore the parallels between these recent events and the famous debate between Kelsen and Schmitt. In Brazil, it would seem that Kelsen’s position prevails. 

In Brazil, as in other countries, the President of the Republic is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, the President is not free to deploy the powers of the military power at his whim. The Armed Forces are not an instrument that can be used to constrain the Judiciary, even in the event of the latter’s overreach. 

The Armed Forces are not a political power, in the traditional sense, but would assume such status if the previously described interpretation were to prevail. There is no sign that the political tension in Brazil will end anytime soon. But when it does end, it will most likely not be thanks to the use of military power as a mediating force.  

Bruno Ceretta is a Lawyer and PhD Candidate (Law) at the University of São Paulo. He holds a Master of Laws from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. 

Suggested Citation: Bruno Ceretta, ‘Political Power and Legal Power in the Brazilian Constitution: The recent debate on the role of the armed forces’ IACL-AIDC Blog (4 May 2021) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2021-posts/2021/05/04-political-power-and-legal-power-in-the-brazilian-constitution.