Monarchy and Direct Democracy in Liechtenstein – An Impossible Combination?

Wilfried Marxer

Liechtenstein Institute

The Principality of Liechtenstein celebrates the centenary of its constitution in 2021. In 1921, this marked the transition from the constitutional monarchy of 1862 to a monarchically-democratically mixed constitution of 1921. Major achievements of the 1921 constitution were that all members of parliament were now elected by the people, whereas previously the Prince had also been entitled to appoint three out of fifteen mandates; moreover, the government had to consist of Liechtenstein citizens, proposed by parliament and appointed by the Prince, whereas previously the Prince had appointed the government, which had consisted of foreign civil servants; also essential was the innovation that the people were granted direct democratic rights; finally, it should be mentioned that the seat of the courts was transferred from Austria to Liechtenstein. 

The former dominance of the Prince in the state had to give way to a division of power between the Prince and the people. In this respect, Article 2 of the constitution sounds programmatic: "The Principality is a constitutional, hereditary monarchy on a democratic and parliamentary basis (...); the power of the State is embodied in the Reigning Prince and the People and shall be exercised by both under the conditions set forth in the provisions of this Constitution.”

This division of power between the Prince and the people is evident, among other things, in the formation of the government and the position of the parliament. On the one hand, the people elect a parliament every four years, which currently consists of 25 members. On the other hand, the Prince has the right to dissolve the parliament if he invokes substantial reasons (Art. 48 para. 1). After the election, the parliament proposes a five-member government, which must be appointed by the Prince (Art. 79 para. 2). The Reigning Prince can thus also refuse the appointment. Moreover, the government needs the confidence of both parliament and the Prince during its term of office. The Prince as well as parliament can dismiss the government if that confidence has been lost.

This article, however, focuses more specifically on direct democratic rights. In the constitution of 1921, the people were granted the right to launch a legislative or constitutional initiative by means of a collection of signatures or resolutions of a certain number of municipal assemblies, so that as a rule a popular vote is held on it (Art. 64). Similarly, since then, a referendum can be launched in this way against a legislative or financial decision by parliament, or parliament can, on its own initiative, submit a bill to the people (Art. 66).

The result of such a popular vote is binding on parliament. However, both the decisions of parliament and the decisions of the people to adopt a bill require the additional sanction of the Prince. If the Prince does not sign the bill, it has failed. The strong power of the Prince has raised concerns with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and also led to a corresponding downgrading in Freedom House's democracy ranking.

Over the decades, the hurdle for initiatives and referendums has tended to fall. Although the number of required signatures was increased in 1947 and 1984, the increase in the number of persons entitled to vote was significantly higher. The same applies to the threshold which of the above-mentioned financial decisions can be submitted to a referendum.

Other constitutional amendments after 1921 were also favourable to the direct democratic participation of the people. In 1992, the possibility was introduced to vote on international treaties – either on the basis of a citizen-initiated referendum or because parliament so decides. Furthermore, in 2003, several constitutional provisions were amended or newly introduced on the basis of a popular initiative launched by the Reigning Prince and the Hereditary Prince. This includes a referendum on the election of judges if the competent bodies cannot reach agreement (Art. 96); the municipalities can secede from the state by direct democratic means, although there are still some hurdles for that (Article 4 para 2); the people, on the basis of an initiative, can also pass a motion of no confidence against the Reigning Prince, which, however, just entails to be dealt with by the Princely House (Art. 13ter); finally, the people can also initiate the abolition of the monarchy and decide on the introduction of a republican constitution (Art. 113). Specific rules apply to all of these procedures, but none of these new rights have yet been applied. In the case of referendums on the appointment of judges and the abolition of the monarchy, it should be added that the Prince's right of veto does not apply.

After Switzerland in first place, Liechtenstein is one of the states with the highest number of nationwide referendums  – and it provides a wide range of direct democratic instruments, also called legal designs. In the hundred years since the constitution came into existence, there have been 46 popular votes based on a parliamentary resolution, 37 popular initiatives, and 28 referendums. In most cases, no conflict between the Prince and the people emerged. However, there are exceptions, the most prominent of which are presented here.

In 1961, the only refusal of the Prince’s sanction to date occurred. The people approved a popular initiative for a new hunting law by 51 percent, but the Prince refused to sign. However, the refusal was entirely supported by the two parliamentary and governing parties, so that a new and improved law was quickly passed and the people approved this bill with 54.6%.

Concerning the vote on accession to the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992, there was a dramatic rift between the government and parliament on the one side, and the Prince on the other. The contested issue was the date of the vote – namely, whether the referendum should take place before or after the Swiss referendum on an accession to the EEA. This conflict goes down in the annals of Liechtenstein as the so-called state crisis. Despite the rejection of the EEA accession by the Swiss electorate, the people of Liechtenstein voted in favour two weeks later with 55.8%.

The EEA vote set the stage for long-lasting discussions on a constitutional revision. As no compromise between the parliament and the Princely House emerged, the Prince and the Hereditary Prince resorted to a popular initiative. The referendum campaign was very emotional and left deep traces in society. In the end, 64.3% voted in the 2003 ballot for the proposal of the Princely House, only 16.6% reached a democratically oriented counter-initiative, which would not have been sanctioned by the Prince anyway, as he had announced before.

The threat of a princely veto was also announced in 2011 on a popular initiative to legalise abortion. Not least due to this announcement of the Hereditary Prince, meanwhile entrusted with the affairs of state, the initiative failed with 47.7%.

The use of veto threats in 2003 and 2011 prompted the democracy movement in Liechtenstein to launch an initiative to abolish the Prince's right of veto after a popular vote. However, this caused the emotional waves of 2003 to boil up again, so that it was only supported by 23.6% at the ballot box.

As we have seen, Liechtenstein has a mixed constitution with strong direct democratic rights, but also strong powers of the Prince. This forces all actors, including government and parliament, to take a consensus-oriented course that is capable of winning a majority in an eventual ballot and also the sanction of the Prince. Despite various conflicts between the Prince and the people or their representative bodies in the course of the last 100 years, the system is nonetheless characterised by a high degree of stability, which is expressed not least in a high level of trust in the institutions – the Princely House included – but also in a high voter turnout in elections and popular votes.

Dr. Wilfried Marxer, Political Scientist, Former Research Fellow Politics, now Freelance Research Associate of the Liechtenstein Institute, Bendern (Principality of Liechtenstein).

Suggested Citation: Wilfried Marxer, ‘Monarchy and Direct Democracy in Liechtenstein – An Impossible Combination?’, IACL-AIDC Blog (14 December 2021) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/centenary-constitution-liechtenstein/2021/12/14/monarchy-and-direct-democracy-in-liechtenstein-an-impossible-combination .